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Discrimination is fundamental to the business of auto and homeowners
insurance. Yet state insurance law does remarkably little to police
against the risk that this discrimination will unfairly harm minority or
low-income communities. Not only do state insurance regulators
completely ignore the prospect that facially-neutral insurance practices
might disparately impact vulnerable populations, but they affirmatively
suppress the production and dissemination of data that would advance
a better understanding of this risk. Meanwhile, most states continue to
cling to an antiquated, ineffective, and inefficient scheme of “public
utility style” rate regulation that purports to prohibit “excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory” insurance rates. This scheme
not only undermines the operation of efficient insurance markets, but
also helps to shield the industry and state regulators from scrutiny
regarding how insurance practices impact larger social goals—like
facilitating socio-economic mobility. This Article argues that insurance
law should scrap its regime of public utility style rate regulation in favor
of a civil rights approach to anti-discrimination law. Such an approach
should, at a minimum, promote the collection and public disclosure of
company-specific, transaction-level data on insurance applications,
purchases, losses, and policyholder membership in legally protected
groups—much in the manner of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.
Further paralleling modern anti-discrimination regimes in consumer
finance, this civil rights approach should afford private parties a cause
of action against insurers based on a modified disparate impact theory
that reflects the important role of risk-based discrimination in insurance
markets. This could be accomplished by recognizing that insurance
discrimination based on factors that genuinely predict claim frequency
or severity, even after controlling for prohibited characteristics,
constitutes a “legitimate non-discriminatory” practice under the familiar
burden-shifting scheme for disparate impact liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Discrimination is fundamental to the business of auto and homeowners insurance. From deciding who they will cover, to how much
they will charge for coverage, to what forms of coverage they will provide, property and casualty insurers devote immense attention to classifying individuals into various different groups and sub-groups.1
These classifications have immeasurable practical consequences, impacting people’s wealth, where they can live, what jobs they can take,
and their financial security. Insurance discrimination, in short, is both
ubiquitous and enormously important in shaping peoples’ lives.
Despite the significance of insurance discrimination in modern
America, the law does remarkably little to police against the risk that
this discrimination will unfairly harm minority or low-income communities. For instance, state laws prohibiting “unfair discrimination” in
property and casualty insurance markets simply require insurers to
have an actuarial justification for their discriminatory practices.2 Although some states also prohibit discrimination on the basis of factors
like race, ethnicity, national origin, or income, courts and regulators
construe these laws extremely narrowly.3 As a result, these more specific anti-discrimination laws merely prohibit insurers from formally
incorporating prohibited characteristics into their models or intentionally constructing proxies for these characteristics.4
By contrast, state insurance law and regulation entirely ignores the
prospect that facially-neutral practices might disparately impact minority or low-income populations.5 This, of course, is a risk whenever
a correlation exists between a policyholder trait used by insurers (such
as zip code) and a suspect policyholder characteristic (such as race or
income). Insurers and some commentators vehemently defend this approach, suggesting that disparate impact analysis of any kind is fundamentally incompatible with risk-based insurance pricing.6 And
undermining risk-based pricing, the argument goes, risks jeopardizing
1. See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULA(6th ed. 2015).
2. See Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J.
REG. 941, 988 (2018); Anya E.R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is
a Rational Discrimination Policy Rational?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 624, 630 (2017).
3. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 215–16 (2014).
4. Id. at 198–99.
5. See, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 422 (Tex. 2011) (holding that Texas law
does not consider whether facially neutral discrimination disparately impacts members of protected groups).
6. See Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfairly Discriminatory Insurance Rates, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM, Winter 2009, at 276, 276; see also Our Positions: Disparate
TION
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the competitiveness and efficiencies of personal lines insurance markets in the United States.7
But state insurance laws fundamentally err by ignoring when and
how personal lines insurance practices impact minority and low-income communities. Given the necessity of auto and homeowners insurance for social and economic advancement, insurance
discrimination can reinforce preexisting inequalities and undermine
economic mobility.8 In fact, there is substantial evidence that numerous types of insurance discrimination—such as insurers’ pricing of
coverage based on credit information, marital status, geography, and
occupation—do exactly this.9
These public policy concerns deserve legal and regulatory attention
even if, as is surely the case, insurance discrimination also frequently
serves the important purpose of promoting risk-based pricing. Some
types of insurance discrimination, for instance, may disparately impact
vulnerable communities even though their primary value to insurers is
to extract profit from relatively price-inelastic consumers, rather than
to price risk.10 In these cases—which appear to be relatively common
in some auto and homeowners insurance markets—insurers’ own arguments for resisting disparate impact are simply inapplicable. But
even when insurance discrimination that harms vulnerable populations is indeed risk-based, it hardly follows that insurers do not have
less discriminatory alternatives available to limit the harmful impact
of their practices while preserving the benefits.
States’ refusal to interrogate the impact of facially-neutral, riskbased insurance discrimination is problematic for another reason as
well: It fails to police against the risk that the predictive power of a
facially-neutral trait derives from its correlation with a suspect trait,
like race or income.11 Unlike ordinary disparate impact, such “proxy
discrimination” exists only when the usefulness to the insurer of a
facially-neutral practice (like zip code) is directly attributable to its
Impact Rule NAMIC, https://www.namic.org/Issues/disparate-impact-rule (last visited Oct. 29,
2019) [hereinafter Our Positions].
7. See Miller, supra note 6; see also Our Positions, supra note 6.
8. See Julia Angwin et al., Car Insurance Companies Charge Higher Rates in Some Minority
Neighborhoods, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerprotection/car-insurance-companies-charge-higher-rates-in-some-minority-neighborhoods/
[hereinafter ProPublica Study].
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Darcy Steeg Morris, Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Daniel Schwarcz., Do Credit-Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting
Auto Claim Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 398–99 (2017).
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correlation with a suspect classifier (like race). Thus, while insurers’
use of credit information to price coverage disparately impacts African Americans and low-income applicants, whether this practice arises
to “proxy discrimination” depends on why credit information is predictive of future claims.12 If poor credit history is predictive of insurance costs because it identifies low-income policyholders who are
more likely to file claims only moderately above their deductible, then
insurer use of this information would constitute proxy discrimination
for income; the predictive power of credit information—and thus its
usefulness to insurers—would derive from its correlation with a legally suspect characteristic (i.e., income).13
Proxy discrimination in insurance is substantially more troubling
than ordinary disparate impact because it strikes at the heart of the
logic behind state laws that limit actuarially justified insurance discrimination. Such laws are premised on the notion that insurers should
not penalize policyholders for being members of certain groups even if
group membership is predictive of risk. In some cases, as with race or
ethnicity, allowing such discrimination would reinforce and exacerbate preexisting inequalities. In other cases, like income, this discrimination could undermine broader goals of economic mobility. Proxy
discrimination produces these results by indirectly targeting members
of protected groups for higher premiums. As such, it partially replicates (depending on the effectiveness of the proxy) the outcomes that
would result if insurers directly discriminated against members of protected groups.14
States’ laws governing insurance discrimination thus do little to protect discrete minority groups. But this is only half the problem. They
also produce massively inefficient regulation that serves no legitimate
public policy goal. Countless state regulators spend innumerable
hours attempting to understand increasingly complex insurer pricing
algorithms in an effort to determine whether they are actuarially justi-

12. See FTC, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE (July 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-in
surance-scores-impacts-consumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_credit-based_insurance_scores.pdf [hereinafter FTC Study].
13. Most states do not formally include income among the characteristics that insurers are
prohibited from considering in their rating and underwriting models. Nonetheless, as the Federal
Trade Commission has recognized since 2007, insurer discrimination based on income “appears
to be generally regarded as an illegitimate variable for those purposes.” FTC Study, supra note
12. This understanding has only become more clear since 2007. See Steeg Morris, Teitelbaum &
Schwarcz, supra note 11.
14. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 11.
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fied.15 Such rate regulation is designed not only to police against “unfair discrimination,” but also to prevent insurers from charging
“excessive” rates. These were real risks when insurance rate regulation was established in the early-to-mid twentieth century, as the law
explicitly permitted insurers to collectively set their rates, thus undermining competitive market forces.16 But the law no longer tolerates
such collusion in property and casualty insurance markets. To the contrary, state laws and relatively low barriers to entry ensure that most
property and casualty insurance markets are extremely competitive
with respect to rates.17 As a result, there is simply no need for state
regulators to police insurance rates to ensure that they are neither
excessive nor premised on unsound actuarial assumptions.
Addressing both the inefficiencies and the deficiencies in insurance
anti-discrimination law requires moving from the outdated public utility model of rate regulation that currently predominates in the states
to a civil rights approach to insurance anti-discrimination law. How
this might be accomplished could vary by state. But one promising
option would be for states to abandon their prohibitions on “excessive” or “unfairly discriminatory” insurance rates, while simultaneously mandating that insurers collect and publicly disclose companyspecific, transaction-level data that includes premiums, claims
payouts, coverage features, policyholders’ zip codes, income, and
membership in legally protected groups18—much in the manner of the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.19 This reform would allow interested
parties to analyze how individual insurers’ practices impact minority
and low-income communities. Further paralleling modern anti-discrimination regimes, private parties might be afforded a private cause
of action based on a modified disparate impact theory that reflects the
important role of risk-based discrimination in insurance markets.
This redesign of insurance anti-discrimination law could increase
the efficiency of state insurance regulation while better protecting
members of legally protected groups and enhancing economic mobil15. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 951. As it has become increasingly obvious that state insurance regulators do not have the resources or expertise to conduct these audits, they have yielded
more and more responsibility to staff at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC)—a private entity that is not subject to state laws governing transparency and accountability. See NAIC, BIG DATA WORKING GROUP CHARGES, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., https://
www.naic.org/cmte_ex_bdwg.htm; see also Improving U.S. Insurance Regulation, BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Improving-U.S.Insurance-Regulation.pdf.
16. See Schwarcz, supra note 2.
17. Id. at 945.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 (2013).
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ity. It would allow states to finally jettison their increasingly futile efforts to audit the accuracy of insurers’ rating models. Not only would
this save substantial regulatory resources, but it would decrease unnecessary compliance costs for insurers and eliminate some of the potential distortions associated with traditional insurance rate
regulation, such as increasing the stickiness of insurers’ rating schemes
and deterring valuable innovation. At the same time, embracing a civil
rights approach to insurance anti-discrimination law would directly
confront the inequalities that are reinforced by current market practices. Perhaps even more importantly, it would lay the foundations for
adapting to a new age of insurance discrimination, which will be
driven more by artificial intelligence (AI) and Big Data than by traditional statistical models and the exercise of human discretion.20
I.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM FOR REGULATING INSURANCE
DISCRIMINATION

Insurance anti-discrimination rules—like most other forms of insurance law and regulation—are principally set by the states. This Part
provides an overview of these regimes as they apply to property and
casualty insurers. Part I.A sets the stage by explaining how and why
insurers discriminate in the first place. Part I.B then describes state
laws prohibiting “unfair discrimination” in property and casualty insurance markets and the enforcement of these rules through regulatory rate review. Finally, Part I.C describes state laws that prohibit
insurance discrimination irrespective of whether it can be actuarially
justified.
A. Insurance Discrimination in Rating and Underwriting
Insurance is the business of transferring risk from policyholders to
insurers. For this business to remain viable, insurers generally must
discriminate among policyholders. Failing to do so can trigger the twin
insurance problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, causing
premiums to increase and individuals to gradually opt out of the insurance marketplace.21 Even in the absence of substantial moral hazard
or adverse selection, insurers can increase their profits by doing a better job than their competitors of accurately assessing and pricing poli20. As used here, “artificial intelligence” and big data encompass “a broad array of computational techniques for predicting future outcomes based on analysis of vast amounts of past data”
gathered from disparate sources. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 11. For extended discussion of
these topics in the insurance setting, see id.
21. See generally ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1.
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cyholder risk.22 The resulting risk signaling can encourage
policyholders to invest in more effective precautions or to efficiently
decrease their activity levels.23
Insurers discriminate among different types of policyholders
through both their underwriting and rating processes. Underwriting
traditionally referred to the decision whether to accept or reject an
insurance applicant. Increasingly, however, underwriting also encompasses insurers’ assignment of policyholders to different (i) “rating
tiers” within a single insurance entity or (ii) “standard” and “nonstandard” insurance companies within a commonly-owned “insurance
group.”24 Once applicants are assigned to their appropriate groupings,
a second level of discrimination typically occurs through the assignment of rates to policyholders within each rating tier or company to
determine their premiums.25 The insurer typically assigns a base rate
for each group of policyholders, which is varied for each individual
policyholder based on various rating factors that are contained in the
insurer’s rating manual or automated rating engines.26
In practice, the line between rating and underwriting has become
increasingly blurred in recent decades. Insurers often use underwriting
to develop dozens or even hundreds of different rating tiers, with the
effect that underwriting ends up more substantially affecting the rates
that policyholders are charged than whether or not they are offered
coverage.27 And like the rating process, underwriting is now frequently carried out through complex algorithms and AI, rather than
by a human underwriter who must exercise individualized judgment.28
Not only has underwriting become increasingly similar to rating, but
rating is at least theoretically capable of replicating the traditional
function of underwriting: rating algorithms that generate exorbitant
22. Id.
23. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 209–10 (2012); Peter Molk, Playing With Fire? Testing
Moral Hazard in Homeowners Insurance Valued Policies, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 347, 392 (2018)
(examining the link between insurer pricing and policyholder behavior).
24. GEOFF WERNER & CLAUDINE MODLIN, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y BASIC RATEMAKING 16 (2010).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 13.
27. See NAIC, Price Optimization White Paper (2015), http://www.naic.org/documents/commit-tees_c_catf_related_price_optimization_white_p-aper.pdf [http://perma.cc/E5FN-63JX]; see
also Robert J. Walling III, Underwriting Power Tools for Small Business Insurance, PINNACLE
MONOGRAPH (2008), https://www.pinnacleactuaries.com/Portals/0/SiteContent/Publications/P-innacle_Monograph_Underwriting_Power_Tools_Walling.pdf.
28. See Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 354
(2014). Subjective underwriting by individuals still persist in some commercial coverage lines
where each prospective policyholder is perceived to present unique risks.
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prices for a subset of policyholders deemed to be high-risk can, as a
practical matter, amount to a refusal to offer coverage.
Both insurance rating and underwriting have increased dramatically
in sophistication over the last decade. Historically, insurers used relatively simple univariate statistical models to develop their rating
plans.29 The relationship between any individual rating factor and
rates was relatively intuitive in these models. Underwriting guidelines
were generally even more straight-forward to understand, consisting
less of statistical models and more of relatively straight-forward rules
and standards that were applied by human underwriters.30 In recent
years, however, insurers have deployed increasingly complex statistical models in their rating and underwriting.31 For instance, most insurers have now replaced univariate statistical models with substantially
more complex generalized linear models to set their rates, including
not just logistic regression, but also Poisson regression, gamma regression, and multinomial regression.32 And many insurers go much further, deploying models using random forest, decision trees, or neural
networks.33 Often, these models incorporate the output of sub-models, such as credit scoring models.34
These complexities are greatly multiplied when insurers’ statistical
models are developed through machine learning techniques, as is becoming more common. Such machine learning relies on an AI to develop algorithms based on training datasets for which the outcome of
interest is known.35 Training datasets generally include external data
that insurers acquire from third-parties, rather than directly from the
insurance applicant.36 Unlike traditional statistical models, machinelearning models are not driven by a human’s intuition or hypothesis
regarding cause and effect.37 Instead, they use raw computing power
to identify attributes that predict their programmed outcome of inter29. NAIC, Regulatory Review of Predictive Models (2019), https://www.naic.org/documents/comte_c_catf_predictive_model_white_paper_190510_clean.docx [hereinafter Predictive Models
Whitepaper].
30. See WERNER & MODLIN, supra note 24.
31. Id. at 176.
32. Id. at 177.
33. Id. at 185–86.
34. Id.
35. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
673–79 (2016).
36. N.Y. DEPT. FIN. SERVS., INSURANCE CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 1: USE OF EXTERNAL CONSUMER DATA AND INFORMATION SOURCES IN UNDERWRITING FOR LIFE INSURANCE (2019),
https://dfs.n-y.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2019_01.
37. JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CAUSE
AND EFFECT 349 (2018).
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est. For this reason, the ultimate statistical models that AIs derive are
often nearly impossible to explain intuitively.38
B. State Prohibitions on “Unfair Discrimination”
Although discrimination in insurance rating and underwriting
serves important economic goals, virtually every state in the country
prohibits property and casualty insurers from engaging in “unfair discrimination.”39 This prohibition against “unfair discrimination” is also
an important professional norm for underwriters, actuaries, and
others involved in the pricing, design, and sale of insurance products.40
It is widely understood within both the regulatory community and the
industry to require that discrimination by insurers must be grounded
in sound actuarial data and principles.41 In general, this requires that
insurers who discriminate among different policyholders must have a
reasonable and empirically grounded basis for believing that such discrimination reflects differences in risk levels.42
38. See, e.g., MATT TUREK, EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (XAI), DARPA,
www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
39. See, e.g., 44 C.J.S. INSURANCE § 104, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (“Insurance
rates may not be unreasonable, excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 20-448 (2015) (Arizona); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-686 (West 2017) (Connecticut);
GA. CODE § 33-6-4 (b) (2014) (Georgia); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:29A-4; 17:22-6.14a1 (2013) (New
Jersey); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2303 (McKinney 2000) (New York); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-120
(West 2001) (North Carolina); S.C. CODE 1976 ANN. § 38-55-50 (effective Jan. 1, 2005) (South
Carolina); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-8-104 (7)(C) (2008) (Tennessee); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 48.18.480 (1984) (Washington). The scope of these laws varies by state. Some states only prohibit “unfair discrimination” in consumer-oriented markets. Finally, at least one state (Illinois)
does not prohibit unfair discrimination outside of the health insurance context, though whether
this is true depends on the interpretation of a confusing statutory provision that on its face is not
limited to health insurance, but which is contained within a part of the Illinois insurance code
that is dedicated to health insurance. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/364 (West 2015) (Illinois)
(“Discrimination between individuals of the same class of risk . . . in the amount of premiums or
rates charged for any insurance covered by this article . . . is prohibited.”); 50 Ill. Admin. Code
§ 906.10 (repealed 2011) (“The effect of the Illinois Law is to require that all fire, casualty,
inland marine or surety insureds of the same class shall be treated alike.”).
40. See ASS’N OF HOME OFF. UNDERWRITERS & CANADIAN INST. OF UNDERWRITERS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE UNDERWRITER (2013), https://alu-web.com/about-us/guiding-principles/
[hereinafter UNDERWRITING GUIDING PRINCIPLES] (describing as one of the guiding principles
for underwriters the need to “[f]ollow established risk classification principles that differentiate
fairly on the basis of sound actuarial principles and/or reasonable anticipated mortality or morbidity experience.”); CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY RATEMAKING (1988), https://www.casact.org/professionalism/standards/princip/sppcrate.pdf (“A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs
associated with an individual risk transfer.”).
41. See Prince, supra note 2.
42. See UNDERWRITING GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 40.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL201.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

21-APR-20

12:14

2020]CIVIL RIGHTS/INSURANCE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 667
State prohibitions on “unfair discrimination” are almost universally
paired with prohibitions against “excessive” or “inadequate” insurance rates. Laws prohibiting “inadequate” rates were originally designed to preserve insurer solvency, but are now largely a dead letter
in most insurance lines because they have been supplanted by more
effective solvency tools, such as risk-based capital and reserve requirements.43 By contrast, many states—depending on the particular insurance commissioner in power during the examined timeframe—devote
extensive attention to preventing “excessive” or “unfairly discriminatory” rates.44 In practice, these two restrictions on insurance rates are
tightly related: Rates are typically deemed excessive when they allow
insurers to make a supra-competitive profit, and one of the core ways
that can happen is if consumers are charged rates that are greater than
what is actuarially justified.45
State prohibitions on “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” rates
generally date back to the early twentieth century, when they were
adopted based on the widespread perception that property and casualty insurance markets shared key characteristics with natural monopolies.46 Market conditions in both settings were believed to stymie
competition among rival firms.47 In the natural monopoly setting, this
result was easy to see, as single firms dominated individual markets. In
the insurance setting, by contrast, inadequate competition resulted not
so much from a lack of competing firms, as from the fact that these
ostensibly competing insurers collectively set their rates and designed
their coverage.48 Such collusion was largely understood to be uniquely
necessary in insurance markets so that insurers could accurately predict losses and avoid “ruinous competition.”49
Some individual states, and eventually the federal government,
were only willing to tolerate insurers’ continued price and productdesign collusion if they were paired with rate regulation designed to
prevent excessive or unfairly discriminatory rates. States pioneered
the design of this rate regulation in the early twentieth century, patterning it on the rate regulation that had recently emerged in the natural monopoly setting.50 In both settings, rate regulation was designed
to ensure that consumers were charged “fair” prices that were based
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 117.
See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 943, 945.
Id. at 973–74.
Id. at 952.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 946.
Id.
Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 948.
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on the actual cost of the service they purchased and which did not
allow firms to extract an unreasonably large profit.51 This public utility
oriented version of rate regulation was encoded into virtually every
state’s law when Congress passed the McCarran Ferguson Act in the
mid-twentieth century.52 While declaring the primacy of the states in
regulating the business of insurance, the Act conditioned a key component of this primacy—the limited insurance exemption from federal
antitrust laws—on the states “regulating the business of insurance.”53
The federal government made clear that the regulation contemplated
by this provision consisted of public utility oriented rate regulation.54
States responded by promptly and uniformly embracing such rate regulation, prohibiting “inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory” insurance rates.55
Although some individual states have moved away from public utility style rate regulation in recent decades, most states continue to
devote extensive resources to policing against “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” rates. Virtually all states require insurers to file
an extensive array of documents with the state insurance department
whenever they seek to alter their rates.56 Some states require these
filings to be approved before insurers can change their rates, while
others simply retain the authority to disapprove filed rates within a
specified period of time.57 The intensity of this regulatory review var51. See id.
52. McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2018).
53. Id. § 1012.
54. Spencer Kimball & Ronald Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 556 (1958) (“As stated
perhaps most clearly by Attorney General Biddle: ‘The view we hold toward insurance is not
unlike our policy toward railroad rates, that the fixing of rates by private groups . . . without
active and definite state approval, is a clear contravention, not only of the [Sherman] act, but of
the whole theory that underlies the act, the theory that competition should be free unless it is
specifically regulated by the appropriate body.’ ”).
55. See Schwarcz, supra note 2.
56. For example:
New Hampshire requires under New Hampshire Law (55:8 Property and Casualty Insurance; Rate Filings) Every insurer shall file with the commissioner every manual, predictive models or telematics models or other models that pertain to the formulation of
rates and/or premiums, minimum premium, class rate, rating schedule or rating plan
and every other rating rule, and every modification of any of the foregoing which it
proposes to use. Personal lines filings shall include underwriting rules used by insurers
or a group of affiliated insurers to the extent necessary to determine the applicable rate
and/or policy premium for an individual insured or applicant . . . .
Minutes of Auto Insurance Working Group (June 30, 2017), https://www.naic.org/meetings-1708/
cmte_ex_bdwg_2017_summer_nm_materials.pdf?1530403237253.
57. For a detailed breakdown of which states use which rate review procedures for each line
of coverage, see R.J. Lehmann, 2018 Insurance Regulation Report Card, R STREET (2018), https:/
/www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/RSTREET163.pdf.
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ies substantially across states, time periods, and lines of coverage. In
many states, however, this regulatory review is quite extensive, requiring regulators to scrutinize thousands of documents to assess factors
such as historical claims data, anticipated trends in future claims, nonclaims expenses, investment returns, and the rates of profit necessary
to retain and attract capital to the industry.58
C. State Prohibitions on Actuarially Justified Discrimination
In addition to prohibiting “unfair discrimination,” many states also
prohibit certain forms of insurance discrimination irrespective of
whether or not they can be actuarially justified. However, these laws
vary significantly by state and line of coverage. Most—though not
all—states prohibit insurers from discriminating on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin.59 And a substantial number of states also
ban the use of sexual orientation and gender in certain lines of coverage, like auto and homeowners insurance.60 But these restrictions
hardly exhaust the examples of prohibited forms of potentially actuarially-justified discrimination in insurance. For instance, some states
ban the use of age and gender in coverage lines like auto and homeowners insurance and others ban the use of policyholder income in
some coverage lines.61 Additionally, some states ban insurer use of
specific potential proxies for prohibited characteristics. For instance,
two states ban the use of location or zip code (which has historically
proxied for race) in property and casualty insurance, and several
others prohibit insurer discrimination in auto on the basis of credit
information (which some claim proxies for race or income).62
States generally enforce these restrictions on insurance discrimination against specific subgroups in a highly limited fashion, such that
they extend only to explicit or intentional discrimination. Of course,
these laws clearly prohibit insurers from overtly incorporating prohibited characteristics into their rating manuals or underwriting guidelines. Additionally, they also are generally understood to prohibit
insurers from intentionally discriminating against protected groups by
relying on a facially neutral characteristic that is intended to proxy for
58. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1.
59. Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 234–36, 240 (reviewing prohibitions against
insurers’ consideration of race in insurance).
60. See id. at 251–52.
61. Id. at 244–51, 259–65. With respect to income, there are few, if any, state laws that explicitly prohibit the use of this factor. However, state regulators often treat discrimination on the
basis of income as suspect under the more general prohibition against unfair discrimination. See
FTC Study, supra note 12.
62. See Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 201.
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a prohibited characteristic.63 In fact, the insurance industry had a long
history of doing just that: During the mid-twentieth century, many insurers refused to cover anyone living in “red-lined” geographic areas
that were predominantly African American.64 Although insurers publicly claimed that such redlining had nothing to do with race, the evidence suggests otherwise: Redlining arose directly out of insurers’
explicit prejudices against African Americans, whom they believed
were inherently more likely to incur claims.65 By contrast, to date,
states have rejected the notion that insurers might violate state laws
prohibiting discrimination against discrete subgroups by unintentionally relying on a facially-neutral characteristic that correlates with an
explicitly prohibited characteristic.66
II.

DEFICIENCIES

IN

INSURANCE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

The state-based regime governing insurance discrimination in property and casualty insurance markets is designed to address a problem
that no longer exists. At the same time, it inappropriately ignores
many of the ways in which insurance discrimination can harm minority and low-income groups. This Part explains these conclusions. Part
II.A first elaborates on why state laws prohibiting “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” rates simply do not make sense in modern insurance markets. Part II.B then explains why state insurance law
ought not to ignore the impact of insurance discrimination on lowincome and minority populations, focusing both on disparate impact
63. See generally NAIC, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK (2009) (describing when insurer
use of proxies for prohibited characteristics run afoul of the law).
64. See Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style: Insurance Redlining and the Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J. URB. AFF. 391, 396–97 (2003).
65. See, e.g., id. For instance, insurance textbooks from the 1950s warned underwriters of the
importance of determining applicants’ race and ethnicity in assessing their riskiness. Brian
Glenn, Post-Modernism: The Basis of Insurance, 6 RISK MGM’T & INS. REV. 131, 134 (2003). As
one commentator explained in the late 1970s, “[a]lthough the core concern of the underwriter is
human characteristics of the risk, cheap screening indicators are adopted as surrogates for solid
information about the attitudes and values of the insured . . . . Even generalized underwriting
texts include occupational, ethnic, racial, geographic, and cultural characterizations certain to
give offense if publicly stated.” Robert Works, Whatever’s FAIR – Adequacy, Equity, and the
Underwriting Prerogative in Property Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 471 (1977); see
also Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 537–38
(1983) (describing insurers’ reliance on occupational and cultural stereotypes without any empirical support for these stereotypes). Studies showed that such redlining did not, in fact, accurately
reflect the riskiness of the affected areas. See Robert W. Klein, Availability and Affordability
Problems in Urban Homeowners Insurance Markets, in INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT,
REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Greg D. Squires ed.,
1997).
66. See Miller, supra note 6, at 284; see also Our Positions, supra note 6.
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generally and on the more specific phenomenon of unintentional
proxy discrimination.
A. Inefficient and Impractical: State Prohibitions on “Unfairly
Discriminatory” and “Excessive” Rates
The lynchpin of state insurance law’s anti-discrimination regime—
its prohibition on “unfair discrimination”—is both obsolete and becoming increasingly difficult to meaningfully enforce. Aside from public utilities, insurance is the only domain in the entire economy where
regulators devote extensive attention to auditing the accuracy of private firms’ prices to ensure that they properly reflect the costs of providing a service.67 In most settings, of course, ordinary economic
forces are generally understood to work much better than commandand-control regulation in setting prices. As described above, the logic
for carving out insurance from this default has historically been that
insurers affirmatively colluded to set their prices, thus undermining
competition.68
But as I have explored at length elsewhere, insurers no longer engage in any of the anti-competitive practices that motivated state
prohibitions of “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” rates.69 Until
the early 1990s, many insurers collusively set their rates based on the
publication of “advisory rates” by statistical firms that they ran.70 In
response to increasing federal pressure, however, state insurance regulators gradually acknowledged that promoting accurate information
about expected insured losses did not require collusive rate setting
among insurers.71 To the contrary, insurers merely needed to share
data about their past losses in order to promote collective knowledge
of risk exposures.72 All of the additional information impounded into
rates—including desired profit margins, the value of the float on insurers’ premiums, or insurers’ costs for overhead, marketing, or distribution—need not be publicly shared to accomplish this goal.73
Consistent with this logic, during the 1990s, states broadly moved to
prohibit publication of advisory rates or other forms of anti-competitive collusion in insurance markets. States now require that the statistical entities that collect and disseminate information about past losses
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 942–43.
See supra Part I.
See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 945.
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id. at 967–68.
Id. at 970.
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must be independent from operating insurers and licensed by state
regulators.74 These statistical agents, as well as all other firms, are
broadly prohibited from disseminating any information that could factor into insurers’ rate calculations, aside from narrowly-circumscribed
information about past insured losses and some related data.75 And
even these data can only be published in industry-aggregate form, so
that the pricing strategies of individual insurers are not detectable.76
As a result of these changes, insurers’ sharing of data unambiguously promotes competition rather than thwarting it. Armed with industry-produced loss data, insurers can confidently enter new markets
even though they do not have their own historical loss data on which
to base prices.77 Meanwhile, there is essentially no risk that the modern data-sharing practices described above could result in explicit
price-fixing or tacit collusion.78 Most property and casualty insurance
markets include way too many competing firms for such collusion to
be possible. And such collusion is becoming increasingly difficult as a
practical matter because insurance products are becoming more and
more heterogeneous.79
Not only do state prohibitions on “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” rates no longer make sense in modern-day insurance markets,
but they are becoming increasingly infeasible to implement. As described above, insurance rating and underwriting is increasingly driven
by complex statistical models that rely on Big Data to produce predictions.80 Moreover, the complexity of these statistical models is accelerating quickly as insurers integrate machine-learning techniques into
their model development.
These developments are making it increasingly difficult for state
regulators to meaningfully review insurers’ models so as to assess their
accuracy, as the traditional insurance regulatory regime demands.81
Indeed, “many state insurance departments do not have in-house actuarial support or have limited resources to contract out for support
when reviewing rate filings that include use of predictive models.”82
74. Id.
75. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 970.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 976.
78. Id.
79. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1263 (2011).
80. See supra Part I.A.
81. As one report penned by state regulators understates the matter, “it may take more than a
casual introduction to statistics to comprehend the construction of” these complex nested statistical models. Predictive Models Whitepaper, supra note 29.
82. See id.
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According to a recent report of state insurance office staffing, approximately forty states have no more than three actuaries on staff to review rate filings.83 Instead, states increasingly rely on rate or form
“analysts” to review the rate filings of every insurer operating in their
state.84 Yet most analysts simply do not have the technical background
or experience to have the slightest chance of understanding, at any
level of depth, the statistical rating and underwriting models that insurers are now deploying; such analysts are often hired right out of
college, generally have no graduate degree, and are typically paid
much smaller sums than could be fetched in private industry.85
States have used several strategies to respond to these deficiencies.
Most commonly, many state insurance departments simply approve
rate filings without subjecting them to any real scrutiny. This approach, of course, preserves many of the costs of regulation without
providing any plausible public benefit. Other times, state insurance
departments delegate responsibility for initial review of rating models
to private contractors hired by the department or to staff of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). But this
strategy has problems of its own: It either requires states to make policy judgments based on material they do not fully understand, or it
practically empowers private actors to transform their own policy
judgments into state regulatory action.
In sum, traditional state efforts to directly monitor whether rates
are “unfairly discriminatory” or “excessive” in insurance simply do
not make sense as a theoretical or practical matter. Such regulation
promotes no discernible public interest, yet it consumes scarce regulatory resources and imposes substantial costs on insurers—at least
some of which are presumably passed on to policyholders.
B. Gaps and Ineffectiveness in State Anti-Discrimination Law:
Disparate Impact and Proxy Discrimination
Responding to the various deficiencies of state insurance anti-discrimination law would be relatively straight-forward if there were no
83. See NAIC, REGULATORY RESOURCES REPORT (2018), https://www.naic.org/prod_serv/
STA-BB-19-01.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Warren S. Hersch, State Regulators May Be Undermanned as Duties Grow, Critics Warn,
LIFE ANNUITY SPECIALIST (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.law.uconn.edu/sites/default/files/in_the_media/09-23-2019_State%20Regulators%20May%20Be%20Undermanned%20as%20Duties%20Grow.pdf; see also Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment
Programs: Some Evidence From Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Moss & Carpenter eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2013).
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public policy problems created by insurance discrimination. But, of
course, this is certainly not the case. Even discrimination that is perfectly rational from the perspective of insurers can have substantial
public policy implications by undermining socio-economic mobility,
perpetuating and legitimizing past discrimination, intruding on policyholder privacy, and unfairly stereotyping non-conforming members of
groups. Many states’ laws ostensibly recognize this reality by limiting
or prohibiting insurance discrimination against discrete groups of policyholders.86 But as this Sub-Part explores, in practice, state insurance
anti-discrimination law willfully ignores these pressing regulatory issues, shielding insurers from any scrutiny so long as they do not formally incorporate suspect policyholder characteristics into their
models.
1. The Disparate Impact Produced by Facially Neutral Insurance
Practices
As described above, state insurance law generally does not even
consider whether facially neutral insurance practices have a disparate
impact on ostensibly protected groups. The insurance industry has
been particularly vocal in arguing that any such disparate impact standard could fundamentally undermine otherwise healthy insurance
markets, as virtually any type of discrimination could potentially disparately impact protected groups.87 Consistent with this view, insurers
routinely refuse to collect any data about legally-suspect policyholder
characteristics, and some states affirmatively prohibit the collection of
such data.88 The lack of this data makes it much harder for regulators
or potential litigants to establish whether an insurer’s practices have a
disparate impact in the first place.89
Despite these legal obstacles, there is, in fact, substantial evidence
that a variety of insurer practices do indeed disparately impact protected groups. For instance, several studies have shown that insurers’
use of credit-based insurance scores in pricing auto and homeowners
86. See supra Part I.C.
87. See, e.g., David Snyder, The Insurance Interview: A Discussion About Big Data With
David Snyder, VP of International Policy for PCI, https://www.faegrebd.com/en/insights/publications/-2017/7/the-insurance-interview-a-discussion-about-big-data-with-david-snyder-vp-of-international-policy-for; Miller, supra note 6; Our Positions, supra note 6.
88. See discussion infra Part III.
89. See ProPublica Study, supra note 8 (“Insurance companies do not collect any information
regarding the race or ethnicity of the people they sell policies to. They do not discriminate on the
basis of race,” said James Lynch, chief actuary of the institute.). For a description of state laws
forbidding collecting this info, see generally Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394
(2014) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque].
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coverage disproportionately harms African Americans and low-income policyholders.90 The most important was a 2007 Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) study, which investigated insurers’ use of credit
scores to predict four types of automobile coverage claim risk: property damage liability, bodily injury liability, collision, and comprehensive.91 The study confirmed that African Americans and Hispanics
were disproportionately harmed by insurers’ use of credit scores: insurance scoring increased the expected price of auto coverage for African Americans by approximately 10%, and the expected cost of such
coverage for Hispanics by 4.2%.92 It also found some evidence that
individuals living in low-income zip codes were harmed by insurers’
use of credit information.93
Similarly, several recent studies have provided powerful evidence
that insurers’ use of zip code in rating and underwriting has a disparate impact in auto and homeowners insurance. For instance, a recent
study by the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office found that policyholders living in regions with high concentrations of minorities pay
higher auto insurance premiums than comparable policyholders living
in predominantly white regions.94 In “the most heavily concentrated
minority and lowest income communities,” the report found, “drivers
pay nearly twice as much for significantly less coverage than drivers
with comparable driving records in the whitest and most affluent communities.”95 Another recent investigation by ProPublica found similar
trends.96 Focusing on California, Illinois, Texas, and Missouri, the
study found persistent differences in the amount that a single hypo90. Several studies commissioned by state insurance departments also have found that insurers’ use of credit information has a disparate impact on African Americans and low-income
individuals. See TEX. DEP’T OF INS., USE OF CREDIT INFORMATION BY INSURERS IN TEXAS
(2004), https://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/documents/creditall04.pdf; TEX. DEP’T OF INS., USE OF
CREDIT INFORMATION BY INSURERS IN TEXAS: THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2005), http://
www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/documents/credit05sup.pdf; BRENT KABLER, MISS. DEP’T OF INS., INSURANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT ON MINORITY AND LOW INCOME POPULATIONS IN
MISSOURI (2004), http://www.insurance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf.
91. FTC Study, supra note 12. The FTC was mandated to conduct by the 2006 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
92. FTC Study, supra note 12.
93. Id.
94. See MASS. ATT’Y GEN., PREMIUM DISPARITIES AFFECTING MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME
DRIVERS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/AG-Healey-to-Financial-Services-Committee-Feb22018.pdf.
95. See id. (“The disparity is so pronounced that experienced drivers with excellent records
(no recent history of at-fault accidents or violations) in the communities with the most highly
concentrated minority population pay higher average liability premiums than drivers in communities with the least concentrated minority population who had a recent history of at-fault accidents and/or violations and who purchased, on average, significantly more coverage.”).
96. See ProPublica Study, supra note 8.
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thetical policyholder—a 30-year old female safe driver who is a
teacher with a bachelor’s degree and excellent credit—would be
charged for auto liability insurance in predominantly minority neighborhoods relative to majority white regions.97 Similarly, numerous
studies by the Consumer Federation of America have found that insurers charge consumers higher rates when they have socio-economic
indicators associated with low-income and minority populations.98
Although use of credit information and zip code are the most well
studied insurance practices that disparately impact protected groups,
it is likely that many other forms of insurance discrimination have a
similar disparate impact. For instance, many insurers include in their
rating or underwriting models factors such as policyholders’ occupation, marital status, or status as a renter or homeowner.99 Preliminary
research suggests that each of these factors is likely to disparately impact protected groups.100 Meanwhile, at least some insurer practices—
like charging more for commercial property insurance to building
owners that rent to individuals receiving Section 8 federal housing assistance—so obviously disparately impact minority populations that
no study is needed.101
Available evidence suggests that the disparate impact produced by
these facially-neutral practices can substantially harm low-income and
minority populations. For instance, a recent study on the affordability
of auto insurance by the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) found that
the average cost of auto liability insurance exceeds two percent of median income within 845 majority-minority or low-income U.S. zip
codes.102 This measure almost certainly understates the true affordability issues that low-income and minorities face in purchasing
coverage, as it excludes the cost of comprehensive, collision, and un97. See id.; see also TOM FELTNER & DOUGLAS HELLER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., HIGH
PRICE OF MANDATORY AUTO INSURANCE IN PREDOMINANTLY AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 3 (2015) (finding that premiums for those living in predominantly African American neighborhoods are 70% higher than premiums charged in predominantly white regions).
98. See DOUGLAS HELLER & MICHELLE STYCZYNSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., MAJOR
AUTO INSURERS RAISE RATES BASED ON ECONOMIC FACTORS: LOW-AND MODERATE-INCOME
DRIVERS CHARGED HIGHER PREMIUMS 2 (2006), https://consumerfed.org/wpcontent/uploads/
2016/06/6-27-16-Auto-Insurance-and-Economic-Status_Report.pdf.
99. See GOOD DRIVERS PAY MORE FOR BASIC AUTO INSURANCE IF THEY RENT RATHER
THAN OWN THEIR HOME, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://consumerfed.org/
press_release-/good-drivers-pay-more-for-basic-auto-insurance-if-they-rent-rather-than-owntheir-home/.
100. See id.
101. See Jean M. Zachariasiewicz, Not Worth the Risk: The Legal Consequences of the Refusal
to Insure Properties with Section 8 Tenants, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP. 19, 19 (2014).
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FED. INS. OFF., STUDY ON THE AFFORDABILITY OF PERSONAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 2 (2017).
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derinsured motorists (UIM) coverage and it does not take into account the cost of coverage in non-voluntary markets—which is
typically substantially higher than in voluntary markets.103
2. The Disparate Impact Generated by Some Insurer Practices Is
Normatively Troubling and Requires Regulatory Attention
According to the insurance industry and state regulators, any disparate impact produced by property and casualty insurers’ practices are
irrelevant from a public policy perspective, because they are based on
sound actuarial principles. Importing disparate impact principles into
insurance law would disrupt otherwise well-functioning insurance
markets, subjecting legitimate risk-based pricing to constant secondguessing by regulators and overly-aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers. Moreover, it would produce both moral hazard and adverse selection, as
rates become increasingly untethered from risk.
These arguments are not without merit. Insurance is, in many ways,
the business of discrimination. As such, subjecting all aspects of the
insurance business to disparate impact analysis could well be unduly
disruptive to the industry and consumers. Moreover, distorting riskbased pricing could indeed increase the likelihood of accidents by allowing relatively high-risk policyholders to be shielded from responsibility for their actions.
Yet the conclusion that insurance law and regulation should completely ignore even quite substantial disparate impacts produced by
facially neutral insurance practices is nonetheless deeply misguided,
for at least three reasons. First, the disparate impact produced by the
insurance industry undermines economic mobility. Second, insurance
practices that disparately impact protected groups may not be necessary for insurers to price risk efficiently. Third, in some cases these
practices may amount to unintentional proxy discrimination, which directly targets members of protected groups for worse outcomes.
a. Insurance Practices that Disparately Impact Protected Groups
Impede Economic Mobility
Property and casualty insurance is in many ways a prerequisite to
socio-economic mobility. Without auto liability insurance, people in
most states cannot drive, meaning that they face barriers to working
and securing an education. And without homeowners insurance, most
people cannot secure a mortgage, which means that they cannot
purchase a home. For these reasons, insurance practices that dispa103. See id. at 5, 10.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL201.txt

678

unknown

Seq: 22

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

21-APR-20

12:14

[Vol. 69:657

rately impact minority populations can have an outsized impact on
socio-economic mobility.104 Put simply, the fact that auto insurance or
homeowners insurance is, on average, more expensive or less available for African Americans than whites impedes the ability of African
Americans as a group to own homes, drive cars, maintain employment, or secure an education. This is true even if the reason why insurance is relatively expensive or unavailable to these groups is
because they are, on average, more likely to incur claims.
To be sure, these arguments are hardly unique to insurance. For
instance, many of these same arguments could be leveled against employers, banks, landlords, and universities that rely on facially-neutral
practices that disparately impact protected groups. But that is precisely why all of these types of entities are subject to some form of
government scrutiny when they employ facially-neutral practices that
disparately impact protected groups. Moreover, insurance is plausibly
distinguishable from most other fundamental ingredients to socio-economic mobility because, in at least some settings, the government is
directly responsible for making insurance so necessary. Most obviously, it is the state that mandates liability insurance to drive a car.
But even the requirement that mortgage applicants must maintain
homeowners insurance stems from the rules of the pseudo-government mortgage giants. Because the state helps elevate insurance into a
practical necessity, it also bears some distinct responsibility for ensuring that doing so does not impede the broader goal of promoting
socio-economic mobility. Simply dismissing any consideration of these
harms because of countervailing considerations regarding the efficiency of insurance markets—as insurers and regulators currently
do—fails to meaningfully grapple with the relative costs and benefits
of affirmatively exempting the insurance industry from the disparate
impact regime that applies to virtually all other providers of consumer
financial services.
b. Insurance Practices That Disparately Impact Protected Groups
May Not Promote the Efficiency of Insurance Markets
Despite the insurance industry’s arguments, there is good reason to
believe that at least some facially-neutral practices that produce a disparate impact in insurance markets are not necessary for these markets to thrive.
104. This point is related to several articles that examine using insurance anti-discrimination
laws to redistribute wealth. See generally John R. Brooks et al., Cross-Subsidies: Government’s
Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX. L. REV. 157 (2003).
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First, at least some practices that produce a disparate impact may
not be driven by risk-based pricing but by differences in policyholders’
demand elasticity. Indeed, the ProPublica report described earlier not
only found a substantial difference in the rates charged in predominantly minority and white neighborhoods, but it also found some evidence that these rate differences might not reflect differences in
risk.105 In particular, the study identified differentials in insurance
rates across zip codes by securing premium quotes for auto liability
coverage from numerous insurers based on a single hypothetical person living in different zip codes.106 It then found that these premium
differentials could not be justified by aggregate risk-based differentials in the zip codes—in the aggregate, policyholders in predominantly minority regions experienced similar (or lower) insured losses
than policyholders in white regions.107
To be sure, as both the industry and state regulators have persuasively argued, the implications of these findings are hardly crystal
clear. Most importantly, the experience of individual insurers who
charged higher rates in predominantly minority neighborhoods might
not be consistent with the broader industry trends. For any individual
insurer, the higher rates it charged in minority regions might well reflect the fact that its particular policyholders in these regions did indeed have higher aggregate claims, in contrast to the aggregate
industry experience. Additionally, the aggregate industry data on
claims does not necessarily apply to the hypothetical person for whom
quotes were generated for purposes of the study; perhaps there really
is more risk in insuring the particular type of driver the study focused
on—a thirty-year old female safe driver who is a teacher with a bachelor’s degree and excellent credit—when she lives in a predominantly
minority zip code.
At the very least, however, the ProPublica report raises a substantial possibility that the disparate impact produced by insurers’ practices are not justified by cost-based considerations. As the ProPublica
report itself explained, the objections lodged by the industry and regulators are unlikely to explain the study’s finding of a “consistent pattern of higher prices for minority neighborhoods” that were no riskier
than white neighborhoods.108 Moreover, the Massachusetts Attorney
General’s study also found some similar evidence of racial disparities
that were potentially not cost-justified: according to that study, even
105.
106.
107.
108.

See ProPublica Study, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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policyholders with good driving records living in minority communities paid more for auto insurance than individuals living in white
neighborhoods who had recently had accidents.109 Furthermore, the
limitations in the ProPublica study were a byproduct of the fact that
the industry and regulators do not make individual insurers’ claims
data publicly available, thus precluding ProPublica or any other independent researcher from attempting to respond to the study’s design
limitations.
If insurance practices do indeed disparately impact protected
groups for reasons that are untethered to risk, the explanation likely
involves the phenomenon of price optimization. Price optimization refers to the practice of pricing coverage based on inferences about policyholders’ price sensitivity.110 For instance, a price optimizing insurer
might increase rates on renewing policyholders who it has identified as
unlikely to actively shop for alternative coverage. Such price optimization thrives in competitive settings like insurance because it allows individual firms to extract consumer surplus without forgoing the
business of more price-sensitive consumers. It is therefore hardly surprising that price optimization has been identified as an increasingly
common trend among some insurers, even though the leading insurance industry groups maintain that insurers only base rates on riskbased factors.111
Although a number of states have issued bulletins purporting to ban
this practice as “unfair discrimination,” many states have not done so.
More importantly, precisely because of the increasing complexity and
opacity of insurers’ rating and underwriting models, it is unclear how
well this prohibition on price optimization is enforced. Further reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that, as described above, most current forms of rate regulation almost completely ignore discrimination
via underwriting, even though rating and underwriting are becoming
increasingly intertwined.112 In fact, insurers generally are not legally
required to file their underwriting guidelines with regulators. As such,
regulators’ elaborate rate review processes cannot detect potential
price optimization that occurs via underwriting rather than via rating.
Although regulators can review underwriting guidelines during mar109. MASS. ATT’Y GEN., supra note 94.
110. See Price Optimization White Paper, supra note 27, at 7 (2015). It is thus simply the
insurance version of the economic phenomenon known as price discrimination.
111. See Letter from Dave Snyder, PCI, to Working Group (Aug. 31, 2018) (on file with author). For more recent evidence regarding the prevalence of price optimization in U.S. insurance
markets, see The Markup Whitepaper (forthcoming 2020).
112. See supra Part I.A.
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ket conduct exams, such exams are sporadic and cover a massive
range of potential issues in addition to underwriting.
Additionally, price optimization may result from a combination of
insurers’ marketing and rating/underwriting practices in a way that
would likely evade detection by state insurance regulators. For instance, insurers may directly or indirectly encourage agents who sell
coverage in regions where consumers tend to be relatively less price
sensitive to place applicants in subsidiaries that principally cater to
“substandard” risks.113 Such steering of customers in low-income or
minority areas to relatively high-cost products was well documented
among mortgage-brokers in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis.114
Because this type of discrimination operates through the interaction
of marketing/sales and rating/underwriting, state regulatory review of
rates would be unlikely to detect these trends.
Price optimization is a prime explanation for insurance practices
that produce a disparate impact because minority or low-income policyholders may be particularly likely to have relatively inelastic insurance demand. Insurance is a unique product because most individuals
are legally or practically required to buy it. Yet low-income individuals who live in traditionally underserved areas are likely to have comparatively limited financial literacy, which may impair their ability to
identify insurance that provides the best combination of coverage and
price.115 Moreover, they may have less access to individuals who are
familiar with the insurance industry and can offer trustworthy advice
on this issue. As such, they may be particularly likely to simply retain
the coverage they initially select without actively shopping for
alternatives.
To be sure, it is also entirely possible that some low-income individuals are relatively likely to shop aggressively for insurance based on
rates, because relatively small rate differences disproportionately impact their marginal utility. However, the point here is not that price
optimization necessarily or inevitably disparately impacts minority
populations. Instead, it is that there is a substantial risk of such a disparate impact, yet absolutely no data to test for such an effect. More113. See KEVIN M. MCCARTY, FLA. OFF. OF INS. REG., REPORT OF COMMISSIONER: THE USE
OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION AS UNDERWRITING/RATING FACTORS FOR PRIVATE PASSENGER
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (Mar. 2007), https://www.floir.com/siteDocuments/OCC
RateRpt.pdf.
114. See generally Justin P. Steil et al., The Social Structure of Mortgage Discrimination, 33
HOUS. STUD. 759 (2018).
115. See generally Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy Skills for the 21st Century: Evidence
from PISA, 49 J. CON. AFF. 639 (2015) (describing studies showing a link between socio-economic status and financial literacy).
OF
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over, there are other potential variants of price optimization that
could more clearly disparately impact low-income or minority groups,
even though information about their prevalence is limited. For instance, insurers may price optimize based on cross-selling potential
rather than price sensitivity, causing them to offer discounts to relatively wealthy customers so as to obtain their business for other product lines.116
Facially-neutral insurance practices that implement price optimization strategies should be legally restricted to the extent they disparately impact protected groups. Unlike risk-based pricing, there is no
good social welfare reason for allowing insurers to price optimize. For
instance, price-optimized premiums do not address legitimate insurance market concerns like moral hazard or adverse selection because
the practice targets policyholders who are comparatively non-responsive to rates. Consumers who are unlikely to alter their purchasing
decisions in response to differences in rates are also presumably unlikely to alter their levels of care on this basis. Additionally, precisely
because price optimization is a new phenomenon that is inconsistent
with the traditional prohibition against “unfair discrimination,” it can
hardly be the case that rooting out the practice would unduly harm
the insurance industry.
A second reason that facially-neutral insurance practices producing
a disparate impact may not be necessary for insurance markets to operate efficiently is that there may be less discriminatory alternatives.
The availability of such alternatives, of course, is often a key consideration in lawsuits advancing disparate impact claims. But insurance law
and regulation have rarely pressed insurers to determine whether they
can substitute away from risk-classification practices that disproportionately harm protected groups while maintaining their ability to effectively classify risks.117
That possibility is becoming increasingly realistic. In the last decade,
a suite of technologies have emerged that allow insurers to directly
measure factors more closely linked to policyholder risk then credit or
zip code. Some auto insurers, for instance, are now using telematic
technologies that measure a range of directly relevant factors related
to auto insurance risk—including number of miles driven, frequency
of sudden stops, and travel above the speed limit. Such direct risk116. I thank Da Lin for suggesting this point.
117. The one exception is that the 2007 FTC study did indeed examine whether it was possible
to come up with a less discriminatory alternative than credit. FTC Study, supra note 12. The
study found that it was not. However, whether that continues to be the case given the rapid pace
of technological development in the insurance analytics domain is unclear.
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based measurement holds the potential to reflect each individual’s
driving tendencies rather than imperfectly proxying for these tendencies using factors, like credit, that disproportionately harm minorities.
Similarly, property insurers are now using technologies, like dronebased video assessments, to more accurately measure the risks associated with individual properties. Rather than charging more to landlords who rent to Section 8 tenants because their properties may not
generally be “kept up” as well, it may be possible for insurers to directly measure property conditions both before and after coverage is
bound.118 As these technologies that directly measure risk improve
and become more socially accepted, they hold the very realistic possibility of allowing insurers to price risk more directly through less discriminatory means than socio-economic factors like zip code or creditbased insurance scores.
The mere fact that these techniques for pricing insurance coverage
have not yet supplanted more traditional insurance-pricing strategies
does not undermine this point. In part, this is because insurers will not
take into account the social benefits of decreasing reliance on riskbased pricing and underwriting tools that disproportionately harm
protected groups. But it is also because insurers may have inadequate
incentives to invest in improving their risk-classification schemes, because such schemes are generally non-excludable.119 In particular, improved risk-classification methods can often be easily mimicked by
competitors, resulting in individual insurers having insufficient incentives to develop, implement, and test such technologies.
c. Insurance Practices that Disparately Impact Protected Groups
May Amount to Unintentional Proxy Discrimination
As described above, proxy discrimination is a particularly pernicious type of disparate impact. It exists whenever the statistical usefulness to the discriminator of a facially-neutral practice is directly
attributable to its correlation with a suspect classifier. For instance,
reconsider auto insurance discrimination on the basis of zip code.
There is little doubt that such discrimination disparately impacts African Americans.120 But such discrimination would also constitute proxy
discrimination if the reason that insurers discriminated on the basis of
zip code was because zip code correlated with a suspect characteristic,
118. For another example, life insurers are now directly measuring health-related activities
through technologies like smart watches. See Swedloff, supra note 28.
119. Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L.
REV. 403, 404, 406 (1985).
120. See supra Part I.
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like race. That, of course, is exactly what happened historically, when
insurers red-lined predominantly African American communities: insurers relied on the facially-neutral classifier of zip code because doing so helped them covertly achieve their intended goal of
discriminating against African Americans.121
Importantly, however, proxy discrimination need not amount to intentional discrimination. Instead, an insurer might rely on a faciallyneutral characteristic whose statistical usefulness derives from its correlation with a suspect characteristic like race, gender, or income without the insurer appreciating or intending that result. Returning to the
zip code example, insurance discrimination on the basis of zip code
would amount to proxy discrimination if zip code helped predict insurance claims because of the correlation between zip code and income (which is generally regarded as a suspect characteristic under
state insurance law). This could happen if low-income policyholders
are relatively likely to file claims slightly above their deductible, or
relatively unlikely to promptly repair their cars. In this scenario, insurers would find that policyholder zip code helped them to predict
claims without understanding that the reason for this result was that it
allowed them to target low-income policyholders for higher prices.
In the insurance setting, unintentional proxy discrimination can
arise not only when a facially-neutral practice helps insurers to predict
claims by proxying for a suspect characteristic; it can also arise when
facially-neutral discrimination allows insurers to price optimize by
proxying for a suspect characteristic. Once again returning to the example of zip code-based discrimination, recall that one explanation
for why insurers charge higher prices in predominantly minority communities is because individuals living in these communities may be
less price-sensitive when it comes time to renew their coverage. Suppose the reason they are less price-sensitive is because low-income
individuals are disproportionately unlikely to have reliable access to
internet services, which is practically necessary to comparison shop for
insurance coverage. In that event, insurance discrimination on the basis of zip code would constitute proxy discrimination for income: the
very reason that zip code would be statistically useful to the insurer is
that it proxies for the suspect characteristic of income.
Even unintentional proxy discrimination produces harms that go
well beyond the harms of ordinary disparate impact. This point is easiest to see by recognizing that proxy discrimination can produce the
exact same results as intentional discrimination against protected
121. Id.
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groups, depending on the effectiveness of the proxy. In both settings,
an individual who is a member of a protected group is treated differently because of their membership in that group. Even if this occurs
without the discriminator intending or knowing this result, many of
the traditional harms of intentional discrimination follow. Members of
groups that have been traditionally discriminated against are effectively targeted and penalized for their membership in that group, irrespective of their individual traits or risk levels. The result is not simply
to undermine socio-economic mobility, but to reinforce and perpetuate historically-embedded inequalities, which generally are responsible for the increased risk associated with insuring protected groups.122
Because diagnosis of proxy discrimination depends on why a particular form of discrimination is predictive of risk, the prevalence of such
insurance discrimination is contested and, in most settings, unclear. As
suggested above, whether credit-based insurance discrimination constitutes proxy discrimination is still a matter of debate: although the
weight of the evidence suggests that credit information predicts risk
by measuring past care levels (and hence does not arise to proxy discrimination), some continue to argue that the predictive capacity of
credit derives from its correlation with income. Similarly, insurers that
charge more for commercial property coverage to building owners
that rent to Section 8 tenants claim they are not engaging in proxy
discrimination because the predictive power of renting to Section 8
tenants stems from neutral factors, like the complexities associated
with the program, which tend to slow property improvements. Unfortunately, state insurance regulators have not carefully studied these
issues, at least in part because these distinctions do not currently matter under state law; so long as insurers do not explicitly include race or
income in their rating or underwriting guidelines, they comply with
state law.
However prevalent proxy discrimination is in modern insurance
markets, it is almost certain to become a much worse problem in the
near future, as insurers increasingly turn to machine learning techniques to develop their rating and underwriting algorithms. This is because AIs are inherently structured to proxy discriminate whenever
they are deprived of information about membership in a legally-suspect class that is genuinely predictive of a legitimate goal, like minimizing insurance claims.123 Recall that predictive AIs locate
122. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 11. For discussion of why using actuarially-justified
race and gender based statistics is normatively troubling in the torts context, see MARK A.
FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (10th ed. 2016).
123. See Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 18–20.
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correlations between input data and programmed “target variables”
by combing through massive amounts of training data.124 This process
results in AIs inevitably locating proxies for genuinely predictive characteristics when direct data on these characteristics is not made available to the AI due to legal prohibitions.125 Simply denying AIs access
to the most intuitive proxies for predictive variables does little to
thwart this process; instead it simply causes AIs to locate less intuitive
proxies.
III. TOWARDS

CIVIL RIGHTS APPROACH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

A

FOR

INSURANCE

State anti-discrimination law is premised on an antiquated understanding of property and casualty insurance markets. It is past time for
that regime to evolve by directly targeting the primary public policy
justification for continuing to regulate discrimination in these markets:
that such discrimination may unfairly target low-income or minority
populations. This reframing of insurance anti-discrimination law requires limiting the inefficiencies embedded within the current U.S.
system for regulating insurance rates while more directly targeting socially-problematic forms of insurance discrimination.
This part sketches out what a reformed approach to insurance antidiscrimination law might look like. Part A begins by suggesting that
states repeal their laws prohibiting “inadequate, excessive, or unfairly
discriminatory” insurance rates, as well as the unwieldy system of rate
filing that is designed to facilitate regulatory review of insurance rates.
Part B then suggests a pair of reforms that would more directly and
efficiently target the risk of insurance discrimination that unreasonably impacts low-income or minority populations. First, it suggests imposing disclosure requirements on property and casualty insurers that
mirror those contained in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA).126 These reforms would require insurers to collect and publicly disclose transaction-level data on insurance applications and
purchases, including information about consumers’ membership in
protected groups. Second, it proposes establishing a limited cause of
action against insurers for disparate impact, which would focus on
identifying proxy discrimination and price optimization that disproportionately burdens protected segments of the population.
124. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2002).
125. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 35, at 691–92.
126. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (2012).
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A. De-Regulating: Eliminating Public Utility Style Rate Regulation
For the reasons described in Part II.A, state laws prohibiting “inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory” rates in property and
casualty insurance markets should be repealed. So too should state
laws authorizing state regulators to disapprove rate changes in insurance markets. Because state prohibitions against “inadequate” rates
have already been displaced as a practical matter by modern methods
of solvency regulation,127 the primary impact of this reform would be
to eliminate state regulators’ scrutiny of whether property and casualty insurers’ rates are excessive or unfairly discriminatory.
Although this proposal would substantially impact most states’ insurance markets, it is hardly revolutionary. In fact, Illinois effectively
adopted this reform in 1971, when its legislature failed to re-authorize
its scheme of rate regulation.128 Since that time, several studies have
found that Illinois’s property and casualty insurance markets have
fared quite well from a macro-perspective.129 In fact, auto and homeowners insurance premiums are generally lower in Illinois than in
other states, in part because a relatively large number of competing
carriers operate in the state.130 Their profit margins are comparable to
those that predominate in other competitive consumer financial services markets, and rate changes are generally driven principally by
changes in claims experiences.131
Illinois’s experience is consistent with that of many other states that
have limited, but not completely abandoned, their regulation of property and casualty insurance rates. A substantial number of states have
adopted such deregulatory reforms, typically by establishing presumptions that rate changes reflect competitive market conditions or by
exempting certain market segments from rate review.132 Most studies
of these reforms have found that they generally improve the overall
health of the underlying insurance markets. In particular, states that
deregulate generally see an increased number of competing insurers, a
decreased residual risk pool, frequent and modest rate changes that
track claims experiences, and insurer profit levels that are comparable
to those that predominate in comparable markets.133
127. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1.
128. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 963.
129. Stephen P. D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Experience in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE 248, 281 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 281–82.
132. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 963.
133. Martin F. Grace, Robert W. Klein & Richard D. Phillips, Auto Insurance Reform: Salvation in South Carolina, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY 148–49 (2002); Sharon Tenny-
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Finally, it is worth noting that countries in the European Union
have also experienced positive results from abolishing insurance rate
regulation.134 In the early 1990s, the European Parliament passed insurance reforms that eliminated member states’ capacity to regulate
insurance rates.135 Prior to that time, many member countries exercised substantial regulatory control over rates.136 Since then, member
countries have generally seen an increase in the competitive conditions of property and casualty insurance markets, causing premiums to
decline and the number of competing firms to increase.137
B. Re-Regulating: Establishing a Civil Rights Oriented Approach to
Insurance Anti-discrimination Law
Of course, eliminating existing regulatory schemes is much simpler
than creating new regulatory mechanisms that effectively and efficiently target public policy concerns. As described in Part II.B, discrimination in property and casualty insurance markets ultimately
raises the same public policy concerns as discrimination in other consumer financial services markets: that it may disproportionately and
unreasonably burden low-income or historically-disadvantaged
groups. And while discrimination in insurance markets is indeed essential from an economic perspective, this is also the case in many
other consumer-financial markets, such as consumer finance. For
these reasons, long-standing federal regimes for combatting unlawful
discrimination in the provision of credit provide a good template for
redesigning insurance anti-discrimination law.
son, The Impact of Rate Regulation on State Automobile Insurance Markets, 15 J. INS. REG. 502,
516 (1997). For a systematic description of many of these studies, see SCOTT E. HARRINGTON,
INSURANCE DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2000); Richard Derrig & Sharon Tennyson, The Impact of Rate Regulation on Claims: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 173, 174 (2011); Lauren Regan et al., The Relationship
Between Auto Insurance Rate Regulation and Insured Loss Costs: An Empirical Analysis, 27 J.
INS. REG. 23, 27 (2009); Mary Weiss et al., The Effect of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance, 77 J. RISK & INS. 597, 599 (2010);
Sharon Tennyson, The Long-Term Effects of Rate Regulatory Reforms in Automobile Insurance
Markets, INS. RES. COUNCIL 17 (2012), http://www.namic.org/pdf/13memberAdvisory/131113_
IRC_Tennyson.LongTermEffectsRateRegulatoryReforms.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LXZ-5X2C].
134. Angelo Borselli, Insurance Rates Regulation in Comparison with Open Competition, 18
CONN. INS. L.J., 109, 142–43 (2011).
135. Council Directive 92/49/EEC, art. 29, 1992 O.J. (L 228).
136. See Borselli, supra note 134.
137. See id.; see also Retail Insurance Market Study, Europe Economics 100, 104–05 (Nov. 26,
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/motor/20100302rim_en.pdf. See generally Giuseppe Turchetti & Cinzia Daraio, How Deregulation Shapes Market Structure and Industry Efficiency: The Case of the Italian Motor Insurance Industry, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK &
INS. 202 (2004).
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1. Data and Disclosure of Insurance Practices
The first step in structuring insurance law and regulation to combat
unfair discrimination against protected groups is for the law to facilitate the public availability of relevant data. The reason is simple: without reliable data about how insurers treat low-income or minority
insurance applicants, it is impossible to identify practices that unreasonably harm members of these groups. And given state regulators’
substantial resource constraints and historical inattention to this issue,
other constituencies—including academics, think tanks, journalists,
lawyers, and other regulators—can and should play a role both in
identifying potentially unfair practices and in inducing state regulators
to act on that basis.
Such a reform could be patterned after the HMDA,138 which requires virtually all mortgage lenders to collect and publicly report
loan-level data on a broad range of information that can be used to
identify potentially discriminatory practices.139 Since its implementation in the 1970’s, the HMDA has required public reporting of data on
each mortgage application submitted to virtually all mortgage lenders,
including (i) the identity of the lender; (ii) whether the loan was approved or denied; (iii) specific characteristics of loans originated; (iv)
the census tract in which the underlying property is located; (v) loan
pricing information, including interest rate; and (vi) information about
the applicant, including their membership in a protected class and income.140 The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the reported data to include
additional information about the loan’s characteristics relating to loan
repayment risk, such as the existence of pre-payment penalties and
balloon payments.141
Although commentators debate the relative costs and benefits of
the HMDA, there is little doubt that the data made available via the
HMDA has been immensely valuable in identifying and addressing
gaps in the availability and affordability of coverage across demo138. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012); 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003 (2013).
139. Others have previously proposed this type of reform. See Gregory D. Squires, Bank Reform Offers Opportunity to Address Insurance Redlining, HUFF. POST (July 13, 2010, 12:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-dsquires/bank-reform-offers-opport_b_644542.html. See
generally Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style: Insurance Redlining and the Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J. URB. AFF. 391 (2003).
140. See generally Neil Bhutta, Steven Laufer & Daniel R. Ringo, Residential Mortgage Lending in 2016: Evidence from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 1
(2017). Some of these data, such as loan amount, are reported in broad categories to limit the
risk that individual loan applicants could be identified using the data.
141. See KRIS D. KULLY, CONSUMER FIN. SERV. REV., CFPB ISSUES FINAL GUIDANCE ON
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF HMDA DATA (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.cfsreview.com/2019/01/cfpbissues-final-guidance-on-public-disclosure-of-hmda-data/.
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graphic groups. The data collected and publicly disclosed pursuant to
the HMDA has been used in hundreds of studies of mortgage lending
discrimination.142 Additionally, it has facilitated innumerable private
and public actions that successfully addressed discriminatory lending
practices.143
There is every reason to believe that the public disclosure of
HMDA-style insurance data would produce similar benefits. As suggested in Part II, efforts by non-regulators to understand how protected groups are impacted by current insurance practices have been
substantially impeded by the limited availability of relevant data. For
instance, the ProPublica and Consumer Federation of America studies
have been forced to approximate how specific insurers treat different
types of consumers by securing price quotations for hypothetical consumers; as a result, it is often hard to know whether these results generalize across the population.144 Similarly, the ProPublica study was
subject to legitimate industry criticism—it was forced to rely on aggregate-industry loss experience in targeted regions when assessing
whether differentials in the quotes provided to hypothetical consumers could be justified by loss experience.145 Even the Federal Insurance Office faced significant data availability limitations in attempting
to assess the impact of insurer practices on protected populations, a
fact which is particularly notable given that it was able to use substantial amounts of data that were voluntarily provided by states and the
industry.146
Importantly, developing a HMDA-like public disclosure regime for
property and casualty insurance would create limited compliance costs
142. See, e.g., Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethinking
the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair Housing Act, 83
TEMP. L. REV. 941, 948–49 (2011); Charles M. Lamb et al., HMDA, Housing Segregation, And
Racial Disparities in Mortgage Lendings, 12 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 249 (2016).
143. Henry M. Jay, Full Disclosure: How Should Lenders Respond to the Heightened Reporting Requirements of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act?, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 247, 247
(2006).
144. See supra Part II.
145. See James Lynch, I.I.I.: Why ProPublica Auto Insurance Report Is Inaccurate, Unfair and
Irresponsible, INS. J. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/04/05/
447012.htm; PROPUBLICA, The Car Insurance Industry Attacks Our Story. Here’s Our Response.
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-car-insurance-industry-attacks-our-storyour-response#.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 102, at 2, 10 (“This is the first use of the FIO Affordability Index, and conclusions drawn from this study should be limited because FIO was
unable to analyze comprehensive premium data for all auto insurance policies issued in the fifty
states and the District of Columbia.”). Monitoring Availability and Affordability of Automobile
Insurance, 81 FED. REG. 45,372 (July 13, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-20160713/pdf/-2016-6536.pdf (describing data limitations).
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or logistical challenges for insurers. This is because insurers already
report most of the relevant data to statistical agents for reasons that
should persist irrespective of legal reforms.147 For instance, private
passenger auto insurers must regularly report data to statistical agents
that includes premiums, losses, coverage types, and underwriting factors, which are broken down by zip code or rating territory.148 Statistical agents use these data for two purposes. First, they produce a
variety of reports for state regulators to facilitate their review of
whether rates are “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory”;
these reports would no longer be necessary if the underlying state laws
were repealed, as suggested above.149 Second, statistical agents produce “annual statistical compilations” that report industry-aggregated
data so as to facilitate insurers’ rate-making processes; this function is
essential to facilitating insurers’ predictions of future losses and minimizing barriers to entry, and would thus persist notwithstanding any
legal reforms.150
Although the existing statistical reporting infrastructure would facilitate the development of a HMDA-like regime for property and casualty insurance, that infrastructure is not currently adequate to identify
and police against insurance practices that unfairly harm members of
protected groups.151 This is for three broad reasons. The first is that
statistical agents do not currently collect the right types of data so as
to facilitate analysis of how insurer practices impact vulnerable populations, a fact which is hardly surprising given that their data collection
has historically been designed to support rate-making and regulatory
review under the “inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory
standard.” To illustrate, unlike the HMDA, statistical agents do not
collect any information about policyholders’ membership in protected
groups.152 Indeed, many states affirmatively prohibit insurers from
collecting this information, ostensibly to limit the risk that insurers
might intentionally discriminate.153 Similarly, statistical agents do not
collect various other types of data that would clearly be relevant to
assessing the impact of insurers’ practices on availability and af147. See Schwarcz, supra note 2.
148. See id.
149. See supra Part III.A.
150. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 169, 171.
151. See Da Lin, Missing Data and Anti-Discrimination Laws, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr.
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/missing-data-and-anti-discrimination-laws/.
152. See NAIC, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF DATA AVAILABLE TO INSURANCE REGULATORS
(2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/prod_serv_statistical_sta_zu.pdf [hereinafter STATISTICAL HANDBOOK].
153. See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 89.
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fordability issues, including (i) price quotations, (ii) policy applications, or (iii) policy renewals/cancellations.154
Although the specific data that statistical agents collected from insurers would indeed change under a HMDA-like regime, most of the
necessary adjustments to these data have already been worked out
through public processes. For instance, a working group of state regulators operating under the auspices of the NAIC’s Auto Insurance
Study Group defined in detail the exact parameters of a data call to
facilitate study of the impact of auto insurers’ practices on low-income
and minority groups.155 Unfortunately, this proposal was scrapped at
the last minute.156 Similarly, at least one draft bill in the U.S. House of
Representatives contains a reasonable initial description of what data
could be publicly disclosed so as to allow for the identification of insurance discrimination that may unfairly target low-income or minority communities.157
The second reason that the data that statistical agents currently collect is limited in its ability to facilitate study of affordability/availability is that it is inconsistent in fundamental ways. In particular, some
statistical agents, like the Insurance Services Office, collect transaction level data, while other statistical agents only collect summary data
that aggregates numerous transactions.158 As suggested by the structure of the HMDA, transaction level data is substantially more useful
than summary data when it comes to facilitating analysis of how insurer practices impact vulnerable populations, as it allows for more
robust data analysis that can be tailored to address particularized concerns.159 Nor is this the only important inconsistency in current data
collection by statistical agents. Perhaps just as importantly, while some
statistical agents and insurers report data broken down by zip code,
154. See STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 152; Monitoring Availability and Affordability
of Automobile Insurance, 81 FED. REG. 45,372 (July 13, 2016) (“Notice; advising adoption of
methodology to monitor affordability of personal automobile insurance.”).
155. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & CTR. FOR ECON. JUST., Comments of the Consumer
Federation of America and the Center for Economic Justice to the NAIC Auto Insurance Working
Group Regarding the August 10, 2018 Draft “Report” Outline (July 31, 2017), https://consumer
fed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/cfa-cej-comments-naicautowg.pdf.
156. See id.
157. See Rep. Takano Proposed Bill, H.R.__115th Cong. (2018), https://takano.house.gov/imo/
-media/doc/The%20FAIR%20RATES%20Act.pdf.
158. This difference in how data is reported generally depends on whether the statistical agent
is also an advisory organization that performs data analysis for its member carriers or is instead
simply a creature of insurers that is designed to facilitate regulatory reporting. See Schwarcz,
supra note 2, at 968–89.
159. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that advisory organizations like ISO and AAIS
collect transaction level data from insurers.
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others report the data based on territorial rating zones.160 This distinction is essential, because while there are well developed studies of
how zip codes match on to minority and low-income populations, no
corresponding data exists for insurers’ rating territories.161
Finally, current data collection by statistical agents does not support
analysis of affordability and availability issues because much of this
data is not made available to the public, or even to regulators. Statistical agents do not make any data freely publicly available; in fact, their
business model relies on being able to sell this data to paying customers.162 Perhaps even more importantly, the only data that statistical
agents do provide for a substantial price tag consists of industry-aggregate data that is designed to facilitate loss prediction rather than to
identify discriminatory practices.163 In fact, statistical agents have historically refused to provide state insurance regulators with insurerspecific data, claiming that their contracts with insurers preclude making such data available.164 Industry aggregate data is not only limited
because of its summary nature, but also by the fact that it does not
allow for the identification of whether a subset of insurers are engaging in practices that target vulnerable populations.
The insurance industry has consistently and successfully resisted reforms that would address these data limitations by citing trade secret
concerns and state laws regarding confidentiality.165 But the argument
that any of the data described above would reveal insurer trade
secrets is belied by the fact that similar data is released for mortgages
without undermining competition in that domain.166 More fundamentally, the argument is facially implausible. To be sure, insurers do in160. See STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 152.
161. Id.
162. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1.
163. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, 969–71.
164. See Minutes of Auto Insurance Working Group, supra note 56 (describing how ISO refused to provide Texas regulators with insurer-specific data, causing Texas to abandon the traditional statistical agent model).
165. See Letter from Dave Snyder, supra note 111 (arguing that the NAIC should not even
release industry aggregated data bearing on availability/affordability issues because that data is
“is a trade secret . . . which, if disclosed, would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of the subject enterprise. This data, despite its aggregation, is still data that is not publicly
available. Furthermore, the information has commercial value and was acquired at great cost to
companies. Release of the data into the marketplace would pose the risk of substantial injury to
the competitive position of the subject insurers.”).
166. Id. Admittedly, the data that would be collected under this Article’s proposal differs
from the data that is currently collected from mortgage lenders via HMDA. In particular,
HMDA does not require lenders to disclose their losses on mortgages, whereas such data collection is necessary in the insurance context to determine whether an individual insurer’s pricing is,
in fact, risk-based.
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deed compete in part by identifying more reliable ways to assess
insurance applicants’ risk of incurring claims.167 But there is no plausible way for a competitor to reverse-engineer an insurer’s risk-assessment algorithms simply by examining limited transaction-level data on
the quotations and coverages that it provides. This is because publicly
released data would exclude the vast majority of factors that are fed
into these algorithms, such as credit information, driving history,
property characteristics, or telematics information. At most, then, the
public release of HMDA-like data would allow insurers to identify
which of their competitors are best at pricing risks (by comparing premiums and losses incurred) but would provide them with no means of
replicating that success by reverse engineering their competitors’ pricing strategies.
For similar reasons, the proposal could be implemented in a way
that would limit any meaningful risk that it could facilitate collusion
among competing firms. To be sure, this risk exists any time competing firms’ prices are publicly disclosed. But because most of the information that individual insurers use to predict risk would be excluded
from the data, it would be immensely difficult for any firm to replicate
the pricing patterns of its competitors based on the disclosed data.
Perhaps even more importantly, there is little reason to suspect that
such implicit price matching would emerge as an attractive strategy
for insurers, given that most property and casualty personal lines markets are served by numerous competitors who regularly seek to undercut one another on price.168 To the extent that collusive pricing were a
meaningful concern notwithstanding these countervailing considerations, one option would be to only release the data after a delay of
several years. This would ensure the ability of the public to police the
impact of insurers’ pricing practices while eliminating the practical capacity of the data to facilitate collusive pricing.
2. A Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact and Proxy
Discrimination
Making HMDA-like data publicly available for personal lines of insurance would go a long way to enhancing understanding of how lowincome and minority populations are impacted by insurers’ practices.
This understanding, in turn, could prove immensely influential in triggering legal or regulatory action at both the state and federal levels.
But such public responses cannot, of course, be assured, as they de167. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1.
168. See Schwarcz, supra note 2.
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pend on numerous political and practical considerations. For that reason, it is sensible to pair the HMDA-style reforms described above
with a private cause of action for insurance discrimination producing a
disparate impact on protected groups.
This proposal is hardly radical. Such a disparate impact cause of
action has long been available against mortgage lenders under federal
statutes like the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act.169 Moreover, property insurers have potentially been subject
to disparate impact liability under the FHA for decades, though this
issue has been complicated by a number of legal questions, including
reverse preemption under the McCarran Ferguson Act.170 In 2015,
HUD published a supplement to an earlier review clarifying that the
FHA’s disparate impact standard does indeed apply to insurance.171
However, more recently, HUD—under the control of the Trump Administration—issued a Proposed Rulemaking that would reverse its
earlier interpretation of the FHA’s application to insurance.172
As suggested by the 2015 HUD rule, a disparate impact cause of
action could largely mimic the well-established burden-shifting framework that courts have developed over the decades.173 Plaintiffs would
need to make out a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that a facially-neutral practice disproportionately impacted members of a protected group.174 If this burden were met, then the burden
would shift to the insurer to show that the challenged practice had a
legitimate non-discriminatory purpose that was rooted in business necessity. Finally, to the extent that the insurer could demonstrate such a
business necessity, then the plaintiff could only prevail if it showed
that the insurer could achieve its legitimate aims with a less discriminatory alternative.175
169. See Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws To Risk-Based
Mortgage Pricing, 60 S. C. L. REV. 677, 692–94 (2009); Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1166 (2017).
170. Dana L. Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2018 (2006); Matthew J. Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging the Application of Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 159, 160 (2011).
171. See Application of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard to Insurance,
81 FED. REG. 69,012 (Oct. 5, 2016).
172. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84
FED. REG. 42,854 (Aug. 19, 2019).
173. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987).
174. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
175. See id. at 432.
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Despite insurers’ many objections, this disparate impact scheme
could be easily adapted to target the particularized public policy concerns described in Part II, while respecting the importance of riskbased pricing in insurance. This is because courts could—and
should—hold that insurance discrimination based on factors that genuinely predict claim frequency or severity, even after controlling for
prohibited characteristics, constitute a “legitimate non-discriminatory
purpose.” The impact of this holding would be that insurers would
only be liable under a disparate impact theory if their facially-neutral
practices disparately impacted members of protected groups and (i)
were driven by considerations of price elasticity or cross-selling rather
than risk, (ii) operated as a proxy for a prohibited characteristic, or
(iii) could be replaced by an equally effective, but less discriminatory,
alternative.
In fact, this framework for applying disparate impact to insurance is
similar to the framework that courts have already developed in the
credit setting. In a number of cases, courts have held unlawful practices that produce higher borrowing costs for members of protected
classes and that cannot be justified based on those borrowers’
creditworthiness.176 In particular, lenders that charge higher prices to
applicants who are relatively less likely to comparison shop for better
mortgage rates are guilty of unlawful discrimination to the extent
these practices produce a disparate impact.177 Just as in insurance, attempts to extract profit from less price-sensitive consumers of credit,
rather than to accurately price the risks associated with lending to individual consumers, do not constitute the type of “legitimate business
necessity” that can justify facially-neutral practices that disparately
impact members of legally-protected groups.178
The framework proposed here would go beyond these holdings on
credit in only one way: by recognizing that discrimination based on
factors that predict risk primarily because they are correlated with
176. See generally Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Fintech Era
(drft. 2019).
177. A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. S. Shore Bank of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Countrywide
Bank, NA, 571 F.Supp.2d 251, 258–59 (D. Mass. 2008).
178. To be sure, it is possible that insurers could attempt to manipulate the “business necessity” standard by arguing in court that practices like price discrimination based on cross-selling
potential constitute business necessity. See generally Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A
Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing when Disparate Impacts are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 669 (2007). But court’s rejection of these types of arguments in lending cases limits this
risk. Moreover, to the extent that insurers do indeed have legitimate business needs to price
optimize for reasons that are not simply about extracting consumer surplus, then it may well be
appropriate for these factors to be taken into account.
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protected characteristics also do not constitute a legitimate business
necessity, because they amount to proxy discrimination.179 Implementing this principle would not be unduly burdensome. In fact, welldeveloped statistical techniques already exist to test whether a factor
used by insurers predicts risk principally because it proxies for a protected characteristic.180 First, the insurer’s statistical model must be reestimated, so as to explicitly include data on legally prohibited characteristics. Second, the challenged facially-neutral variable must be examined to determine the extent to which it retains predictive power
even after having accounted for the legally-prohibited variable. If so,
then its predictive power does not primarily derive from its capacity to
proxy for a protected characteristic. If not, then the opposite conclusion applies.
CONCLUSION
State insurance regulation has long clung to an antiquated, ineffective, and immensely costly set of anti-discrimination laws. State regulators generally defend this regime because it is familiar to them and
assures them of job security. Insurers also defend this regime, as they
have learned how to navigate it reasonably well so as to limit the extent to which it actually constrains their business decisions. The current regulatory scheme produces the added benefit for insurers of
deterring new competitors from entering the marketplace, as was well
illustrated when Google decided to end its brief effort to compete in
insurance due to the uniquely cumbersome regulatory environment
that prevailed in each state.181 The only victims of this scheme are the
public in general, and low-income and minority groups in particular.
For this reason, it is past time for the state-based scheme of insurance
anti-discrimination law to adapt to the 21st Century. Doing so requires jettisoning the public utility model of insurance rate regulation
that persists in the states and replacing it with a civil rights-oriented
regime that promotes competition while protecting vulnerable groups,
so as to facilitate socio-economic mobility.

179. See supra Part II.B. See generally James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2017).
180. See Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, Implementing Anti-Discrimination Policies, in
Statistical Profiling Models, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 206, 207 (2011); see also FTC Study,
supra note 12.
181. Amy O’Connor & Don Jergler, Exclusive: Google to Shut Down Online Insurance Site,
Partners Say, INS. J. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/02-/
22/399490.htm.
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